The international allocation of rights to marine fishery resources is an integral and fundamental part of the European Community's common fisheries policy.

When in 1977 the Community Member States extended their zones of fisheries jurisdiction out to 200 miles in the North Sea and North Atlantic, application of the principle of equal access for all Community fishing vessels (established in 1971) resulted in the creation of a common European fishery "pond". The international allocation of fishing rights was subsequently based on a system of total allowable catches (TACs) divided into national quotas according to the principle of "relative stability" of fishing opportunities. While quota exchanges can be negotiated at government level, there are no institutions for international trade in fishing rights. The basic freedoms of the Rome Treaty, however, allow the movement of capital and labour instead, in what has become known as "quota-hopping". The principles of equal access and relative stability, and indeed the idea of national fishing rights within the Community, while understandable as political solutions, arguably have significant implications for efficient exploitation. Alternatives to the existing system of resource allocation have received little attention, however.

A very considerable part of the Community's budget for fisheries is allocated to the costs of fishery agreements with third countries. At the end of 1999 a total of 24 such agreements were in force, more than half of which were with developing countries in Africa and the Indian Ocean. It is arguable that these agreements are obtained primarily in order to secure fishing opportunities for the Community's distant-water vessels (notably the Spanish and French tuna fleets). Recent research has questioned the value of these fishery agreements in terms of utilising Community fishing capacity and supplying Community markets, but what are the alternatives?

The aim of the final workshop of this Concerted Action is to explore from an economic perspective these key issues of resource allocation, and to consider other international issues relevant to the CFP, such as stocks shared with third countries and the particular problems of the Mediterranean.

Invited speakers are Dr Jørgen Løkkegaard (SJFI), formerly Deputy Permanent Secretary at the Danish Fisheries Ministry, and Dr Steve Cunningham (IDDRA) who was previously FAO Technical Advisor at the Moroccan Fisheries Ministry.

Participation in the workshop is invited from economists, policy makers and others who would like to contribute to a discussion of these issues.

Those interested in participating are asked to submit a short abstract for a discussion paper related to one or more of the themes below. The general focus should be on practical solutions to management problems within the context of European fisheries and the common fisheries policy.

• the economic implications of equal access and relative stability;

• international trade in fishing rights and other alternatives for the allocation of Community TACs;

• issues relating to shared and straddling stocks;

• problems of resource allocation in the Mediterranean;

• the costs and benefits of fishery agreements - to the Community and to third countries;

• issues surrounding the contractual terms of northern and southern agreements.

The deadline for abstracts is 15 September 2000. All abstracts will be reviewed for selection by the Concerted Action steering group and formal invitations will be issued approximately one week later. Funding will be available for all invited participants.

All abstracts should be sent to the coordinator, Aaron Hatcher at CEMARE, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth PO4 8JF, UK; Tel (+44) 23 9284 4230/4082; Fax (+44) 23 9284 4037; E-mail aaron.hatcher@port.ac.uk.

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